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QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND THE
TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS OF
ONLINE STUDENT SPEECH: A REVIEW OF
CASES AND CONTROVERSIES FROM 2009
CLAY CALVERT*
INTRODUCTION
In an earlier article published in this journal,' I addressed
the urgent need for the United States Supreme Court to confront
for the first time a case involving the free speech rights of public
school students who are punished by their schools for creating, on
their own time and with their own computers, websites or blog
postings that mock or disparage their principals, teachers, or
classmates. This article brings that piece up to date through the
first ten and a half months of 2009, examining different
controversies, decisions, and legislation related to this topic that
have transpired or otherwise have been brought to light since I
authored that article.
* Brechner Eminent Scholar in Mass Communication, College of Journalism
and Communications, University of Florida, Gainesville; B.A., 1987,
Communication, Stanford University; J.D. (Order of the Coif), 1991,
McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; Ph.D., 1996,
Communication, Stanford University. Member, State Bar of California. The
author thanks Katy Hopkins of the Pennsylvania State University for her
review of an early draft of this article. He also thanks the editors and staff of
the First Amendment Law Review, both for their professionalism and for
hosting one of the best-run symposia he ever has attended.
1. Clay Calvert, Punishing Public School Students for Bashing Principals,
Teachers & Classmates in Cyberspace: The Speech Issue the Supreme Court
Must Now Resolve, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 210 (2008).
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I.QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND THE BEAUTY OF AMBIGUITY:
WHY SCHOOLS LOVE CONFUSION IN THE LAW
In January 2009, U.S. District Judge Mark R. Kravitz
allowed public high school officials to escape monetary liability in
Doninger v. Niehoff for allegedly violating student Avery
Doninger's First Amendment3 right of free speech when they
punished her for a blog post she wrote off campus.4 The ruling
came despite the fact that Judge Kravitz found evidence that
Doninger, who had referred online to the school administrators in
question as "douchebags," was disciplined merely "because the
blog entry was offensive and uncivil and not because of any
potential disruption at school."5 So just how did the defendants
wiggle off the legal hook? The answer lies in the doctrine of
qualified immunity.6
Qualified immunity, as the Supreme Court recently wrote,
protects government officials from liability for civil damages while
it "balances two important interests-the need to hold public
officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and
the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and
liability when they perform their duties reasonably.",7 As its name
2. 594 F. Supp. 2d 211 (D. Conn. 2009).
3. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in
pertinent part, that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free
Press Clauses were incorporated more than eight decades ago through the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to apply to state and local
government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925).
4. Doninger, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 224. In particular, Doninger claimed that
school officials "violated her First Amendment rights by disqualifying her
from running for senior class secretary as punishment for a blog entry that Ms.
Doninger posted on livejournal.com." Id. at 214.
5. Id. at 219.
6. Judge Kravitz concluded that because the First Amendment right that
Doninger sought "to enforce was not clearly established at the time of the
events in question, Defendants [were] entitled to qualified immunity on Ms.
Doninger's blog entry First Amendment claim. Accordingly, the [c]ourt
[granted] summary judgment to Defendants on that claim." Id. at 224.
7. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009).
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suggests, it is an immunity rather than a defense. Although
application of the qualified immunity doctrine typically involves
consideration of two prongs, the Supreme Court opined in January
2009 in Pearson v. Callahan9 that "[t]he judges of the district courts
and the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their
sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the
qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the
circumstances in the particular case at hand."' Those two prongs
are (1) whether there was a violation of a constitutional right; and
(2) whether the right in question was clearly established at the time
of the alleged violation.1' While Pearson provides courts with
flexibility to determine the proper sequence of these two
considerations, the bottom line is that "[q]ualified immunity is
applicable unless the official's conduct violated a clearly established
constitutional right."12
For Judge Kravitz, Doninger hinged largely on the profound
state of confusion about the scope of constitutional protection for
13
student speech created off campus and posted on the Internet - a
topic the Supreme Court has yet to address. 14 As he put it, "[i]f
8. Id. at 818 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).
9. 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009).
10. Id. at 818.
11. See id. at 815-18.
12. Id. at 816.
13. Doninger, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 222-23.
14. The Supreme Court has considered four cases involving the free
speech rights of high schools students, none of which dealt with off-campus-
created expression posted on the Internet. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S.
393, 397 (2007) (involving the unfurling, at a "school-sanctioned and school-
supervised event," of a banner reading "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS," and holding
that "schools may take steps to safeguard those entrusted to their care from
speech that can reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use");
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (holding, in the
context of the censorship of two articles in a high school newspaper, "that
educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control
over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive
activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns"); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)
(allowing a school to punish a student for making a ribald speech before a
captive audience of schoolmates and holding that "[t]he First Amendment
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courts and legal scholars cannot discern the contours of First
Amendment protections for student Internet speech, then it is
certainly unreasonable to expect school administrators, such as
Defendants, to predict where the line between on- and off-campus
speech will be drawn in this new digital era."'
15
The ramifications of this situation should be highly
disturbing for free speech advocates. In particular, public school
officials can squelch off-campus student speech posted on the
Internet and get away with it, at least without fear of paying
monetary damages, 16 because the extent of First Amendment
protection for such expression simply is not clearly established by
the courts. In a bizarre sense, then, it helps school officials'
censorial powers that the Supreme Court has yet to hear a case to
clarify this muddled area of the law; that is the beauty of ambiguity,
at least from the perspective of those tasked with educating the
nation's youth. Although qualified immunity does not protect
against equitable remedies like injunctive relief, 7 it certainly
eliminates the risk and cost of paying monetary damages from the
calculus involved in deciding whether to censor Internet-based
speech.
In a 2008 law review article, Boston College Professor
Mary-Rose Papandrea captures quite well the state of judicial
confusion-and the divergent directions in which courts can go-
does not prevent the school officials from determining that to permit a vulgar
and lewd speech such as respondent's would undermine the school's basic
educational mission. A high school assembly or classroom is no place for a
sexually explicit monologue directed towards an unsuspecting audience");
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)
(protecting the right of public school students to wear black armbands to
school as a form of protest against the war in Vietnam and as a call for a truce
in that conflict. The Court reasoned that schools may censor such student
displays of political expression only when there is actual evidence that the
speech in question "materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others.").
15. Doninger, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 224.
16. As Chief Justice John Roberts wrote in Morse, "[q]ualified immunity
shields public officials from money damages only." 551 U.S. at 400 n.1.
17. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 315 n.6 (1975) (writing that
"immunity from damages does not ordinarily bar equitable relief as well").
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when she writes that the Supreme Court's quartet 18 of student
speech cases
provide[s] little direct guidance to the lower
courts concerning the authority of school
officials to punish student speech involving
the digital media. On the one hand, all the
Court's school speech cases to date have
involved speech on school grounds or during
a school-sponsored activity; this fact
arguably renders all their cases inapplicable
to digital speech, which typically is created,
shared, and viewed off the school grounds.
On the other hand, the Court's increasing
deference to school administrators indicates
that the Court is willing to give schools wide
berth when it comes to disciplining their
students for their expression, regardless of
which medium they use. As a result of the
lack of clear guidance from the Court, it is
perhaps not surprising that the lower courts
have reached different conclusions on
student speech rights in the digital age.1 9
There is much, of course, that is unclear about the law of
student speech in areas not involving the Internet; just ask Justice
Stephen Breyer, who invoked the doctrine of qualified immunity in
his concurrence in the Supreme Court's most recent student-speech
case, Morse v. Frederick.2" Morse centered on the punishment of
Joseph Frederick, an Alaska high school student who hoisted a
banner carrying the message "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" at what the
Supreme Court considered to be "a school-sanctioned and school-
supervised event."'" Principal Deborah Morse confiscated the
18. See supra note 14 (describing the four student speech cases heard by
the Supreme Court).
19. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60
FLA. L. REv. 1027, 1054 (2008).
20. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
21. Id. at 396.
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banner, which she believed carried a pro-drug message, and
suspended Frederick.22
Justice Breyer considered resolution of the threshold First
Amendment question23 "unwise and unnecessary. '' 24 As he put it,
"[iln order to avoid resolving the fractious underlying constitutional
question, we need only decide a different question that this case
presents, the question of 'qualified immunity.' '2 5 The outcome of
the case, under this doctrine, was clear for Breyer: "Qualified
immunity applies here and entitles Principal Morse to judgment on
Frederick's monetary damages claim because she did not clearly
violate the law during her confrontation with the student., 26 To
illustrate his point, Breyer asserted that "the fact that this Court
divides on the constitutional question (and that the majority
reverses the Ninth Circuit's constitutional determination) strongly
suggests that the answer as to how to apply prior law to these facts
was unclear.,
27
We have now reached a point where student use of new
communication technologies has outstripped whatever clarity
existed heretofore in the High Court's on-campus speech cases. As
Professor Brannon P. Denning and Molly C. Taylor wrote in 2008:
The ability of students to criticize one another
and teachers, and the ubiquity of means to do
so-through computers, Blackberries, phones
with text messaging capabilities-combined
with the perceived severity of the threat to
good order in the schools have left schools
scrambling for responses. That no one knows
quite where the limits to the school's authority
lie only complicates decisions for teachers and
administrators, as well as for students who are
22. Id.
23. As framed by Chief Justice John Roberts in the opinion of the court,
the threshold question was "whether Frederick had a First Amendment right
to wield his banner." Id. at 400.
24. Id. at 425 (Breyer, J., concurring).
25. Id. at 428.
26. Id. at 429.
27. Id. at 430.
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"caught off guard when they are punished" for
things written on "their" websites2 8
Denning and Taylor observe that "the nature of the
Internet does seem to pose special difficulties when attempting to
ascertain whether speech occurred 'in' school or 'on' school
property and how 'disruptive' that speech had to be, assuming that
it was subject to the regulation of school officials.,
29
The High Court must act quickly because the doctrine of
qualified immunity focuses on whether the right in question "was
clearly established at the time of the alleged violation., 30  This
means, of course, that if we assume that the state of the law today
regarding students' off-campus, Internet-based speech rights is
unsettled and unclear, then school officials will escape personal
liability for monetary damages for their actions up until the point
where those actions actually take place after the Supreme Court
finally rules on the issue. The doctrine, in other words, is not
applied retroactively. For instance, in the 1999 Fourth
Amendment-based "ride-along" case Wilson v. Layne,31 the
Supreme Court held that "it is a violation of the Fourth
Amendment for police to bring members of the media or other
third parties into a home during the execution of a warrant when
the presence of the third parties in the home was not in aid of the
execution of the warrant., 3 2 The individual defendants in that case,
however, escaped monetary liability for actions under the doctrine
of qualified immunity because the law was unsettled in 1992 when
the search in question took place. 3   The seven-year lag time
between the offending actions and the High Court's ruling suggests,
sadly, that school officials may continue to dodge monetary liability
when they punish students for off-campus-created, Internet-posted
expression for quite some time.
28. Brannon P. Denning & Molly C. Taylor, Morse v. Frederick and the
Regulation of Student Cyberspeech, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 835, 868 (2008).
29. Id. at 870.
30. Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999) (emphasis added).
31. 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
32. Id. at 614.
33. Id. at 605-06.
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II.LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO JUDICIAL AMBIGUITY:
THE CONNECTICUT EXAMPLE
One method of trying to cope with judicial ambiguity is to
attempt to add legislative clarity to the legal equation. That is what
a bill proposed by state Senator Gary D. LeBeau and now pending
in the Connecticut General Assembly would do. Senate Bill 478
provides that Connecticut "statutes be amended to prohibit school
authorities from punishing students for the content of electronic
correspondence transmitted outside of school facilities or with
school equipment, provided such content is not a threat to students,
personnel or the school.,3 4 Its explicit purpose is "[t]o protect the
First Amendment rights of students."35  The laws that would be
amended govern the suspension3 6 and expulsion37 of Connecticut
public school students.
34. S.B. 478, 2009 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2009), available at
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2009/TOB/S/2009SB-00478-ROO-SB.htm.
35. Id.
36. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-233c (West 2002). This law provides in
pertinent part:
Any local or regional board of education may authorize
the administration of the schools under its direction to
suspend from school privileges any pupil whose conduct
on school grounds or at a school sponsored activity is
violative of a publicized policy of such board or is
seriously disruptive of the educational process or
endangers persons or property or whose conduct off
school grounds is violative of such policy and is seriously
disruptive of the educational process.
Id. § 10-233c(a).
37. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-233d (West 2002). This law provides in
pertinent part:
Any local or regional board of education, at a meeting at
which three or more members of such board are present,
or the impartial hearing board established pursuant to
subsection (b) of this section, may expel, subject to the
provisions of this subsection, any pupil whose conduct on
school grounds or at a school-sponsored activity is
violative of a publicized policy of such board or is
seriously disruptive of the educational process or
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In a press release announcing the bill, LeBeau, a Democrat
from East Hartford, Connecticut, stated:
I'm trying to create a bright line here. The
key is the rationale for punishing students
for speech that is "potentially disruptive."
But if it's not done in school, if it doesn't use
school resources, and it is not sent to school
computers, then it's minimally disruptive at
best and should be protected as free
speech.38
Importantly, LeBeau added in the press release that his
legislation is a response to the Avery Doninger case 39 described
earlier in Part I. LeBeau called freedom of speech "a basic right
that shouldn't be impinged upon without an extremely important
reason." 40 As he told a reporter for the Hartford Courant, "[t]here
shouldn't have to be a bill, but I think we should put something in
there to clarify that [the student] does have rights.,
41
Such a legislative response to judicial problems is not
unusual in the realm of student free expression. A number of states
passed legislation known as anti-Hazelwood statutes42 in response
endangers persons or property or whose conduct off
school grounds is violative of such policy and is seriously
disruptive of the educational process, provided a majority
of the board members sitting in the expulsion hearing vote
to expel and that at least three affirmative votes for
expulsion are cast.
Id. § 10-233d(a)(1).
38. Press Release, Connecticut State Senator Gary LeBeau, LeBeau
Introduces Bill to Protect the First Amendment Rights of Students (Feb. 2,
2008), http://www.senatedems.ct.gov/pr/lebeau-090202.html.
39. Id. See Doninger v. Niehoff, 594 F. Supp. 2d 211 (D. Conn. 2009).
40. Press release, Connecticut state Senator Gary LeBeau, supra note 38.
41. Arielle Levin Becker, Web Speech: When May Schools Act?;
Lawmakers Consider Bill To Clarify Students' Rights, HARTFORD COURANT,
Feb. 1, 2009, at Al, available at 2009 WLNR 2023731.
42. Charles B. Upton II, Dean v. Utica Community Schools: An Arrow
Through the Heart of School Administrative Control Over Student Expression
in School Newspapers, 2006 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 581, 588 n.50 (2006). See also
Richard Just, Unmuzzling High School Journalists, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2008,
[Vol. 8
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to the Supreme Court's 1988 speech-restricting opinion in
43Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier. Kentucky was
considering the addition of such a measure to its laws in 2009."4
The Student Press Law Center noted in a 2008 white paper on the
Hazelwood decision that:
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas,
Massachusetts and Oregon have state laws that
protect the free expression rights of their high
school students. Other states across the
country have considered-and continue to
pursue - enacting similar legislation. In
addition, some states, such as Pennsylvania and
Washington, have state regulations that may
protect student rights.45
at A17 (noting that "[s]ince Hazelwood, several states have passed laws
protecting high school journalists from censorship"); Tracey Loew, Student
Journalists' Right to Expression Expanded; 'Landmark' Oregon Law Shields
from Censorship, USA TODAY, July 11, 2007, at 4A, available at 2007 WLNR
13139880 (describing an Oregon law enacted in 2007 protecting "Oregon high
school and college journalists from censorship," and noting that "[s]ix other
states-Arkansas, California, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, and Massachusetts-have
laws that protect high school journalists from censorship"); Angela Riley, 20
Years Later: Teachers Reflect on Supreme Court's Hazelwood School District
v. Kuhlmeier Ruling, ST. Louis DAILY RECORD, Oct. 6, 2008, available at 2008
WLNR 25790254 (noting that since the Hazelwood decision, "Iowa, Kansas,
Arkansas, Colorado, Oregon, California, and Massachusetts have passed state
free-expression laws that do not allow student censorship").
43. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
44. H.B. 43, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2009), available at
http://www.lrc.ky.gov/record/09RS/HB43.htm. See Associated Press, Kentucky
Bill Seeks Protections for High School Reporters, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Jan.
20, 2009, http://www.editorandpublisher.com/eandp/news/article-display.jsp?
vnucontent id=1003932023 (describing the bill as "aimed at offsetting a 1988
U.S. Supreme Court decision, Hazelwood School District vs. Kuhlmeier," and
noting that "student journalists working for public high school newspapers
would be entitled to free speech and freedom of the press protections similar
to their professional counterparts" under the bill).
45. STUDENT PRESS LAW CTR., HAZELWOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT V.
KUHLMEIER: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE SUPREME COURT DECISION 5
(2008), https://www.splc.org/pdf/HazelwoodGuide.pdf.
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Student expression rights clearly would benefit if states
amended their laws with measures similar to LeBeau's bill to
strengthen protection for off-campus-created student expression.
First Amendment advocates can hope that legislators will follow
the lead of Gary D. LeBeau and propose and support legislation
similar to his bill now pending in Connecticut.
Besides such legal measures to add clarity to the online
speech rights of students, public schools themselves can update
their own policies on expression to protect Internet-based speech.
For instance, the Sequoia Union High School District in northern
California updated its policy on free expression in 2009, adding
"protections for material published on the Internet. '' 46  Schools
should be lauded for taking such steps to adapt their speech policies
to changing technologies.
III.CYBERBULLYING LEGISLATION WILL FORCE THE
OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH ISSUE
In 2009, a bill47 working its way through the Virginia
legislature "left open the possibility that schools could punish
cyberbullying4 s done from homes but only if the action was
46. Shaun Bishop, Sequoia Union High School District Adjusts Free
Speech Policies, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 4, 2009, available at
LexisNexis.
47. H.B. 1624, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2009), available at
http://legl.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?091+ful+HB1624H1. An amended
version of the bill passed overwhelmingly in the Virginia House in February
2009. See H.B. 1624 Code of Student Conduct; Bullying, Harassment, Etc., for
Bd. of Ed. to Include in Model Policy. House: Vote: Passage (94-Y 5-N) (Feb.
2, 2009), available at http://legl.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp5O4.exe?091+vot+HV2
515+HB1624.
48. The National Conference of State Legislatures defines cyberbullying
as "the willful and repeated use of cell phones, computers, and other
electronic communication devices to harass and threaten others. Instant
messaging, chat rooms, e-mails, and messages posted on websites are the most
common methods of this new twist of bullying." National Conference of State
Legislatures, Cyberbullying, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/educ/
cyberbullying.htm (last visited Aug. 14, 2009). See generally Stacy M. Chaffin,
The New Playground Bullies of Cyberspace: Online Peer Sexual Harassment,
[Vol. 8
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consistent with state, federal and case laws., 49 The problem, of
course, is that the case law itself is inconsistent, as the Supreme
Court has not considered the scope of First Amendment protection
for off-campus-created, Internet-posted expression that targets
schoolmates.5°
The National Conference of State Legislatures identified
nineteen states as having enacted cyberbullying legislation by mid-
August, 2009.51 To the extent that such anti-harassment legislation
restricts students' off-campus-created, Internet-posted expression,
it may force the nation's High Court to address the nature and
extent of students' off-campus Internet speech rights sooner rather
than later. This is particularly true because, as Boston College
Professor Mary-Rose Papandrea recently observed, "[c]ourts and
commentators disagree when schools should have authority to
restrict harassing, intimidating, or otherwise hurtful speech even
when it plainly occurs on school grounds. One reason for this lack
of consensus is that the First Amendment does not categorically
exclude harassing or intimidating speech from its protections."52
Indeed, just as the Supreme Court has never heard a case involving
off-campus-created student speech that is posted on the Internet, so
too has it never considered a case involving a school's anti-
harassment policy. The confusion here is problematic, as Professor
Martha McCarthy of Indiana University recently observed:
51 How. L.J. 773 (2008) (addressing cyberbullying and First Amendment
issues that surround its restriction and regulation).
49. Dave Forster, Bill Could Help Schools Punish Cyberbullying, Even If
Done From Home, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 3, 2009, at 6, available at 2009
WLNR 2007213 (emphasis added).
50. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (setting forth the quartet of
student speech cases that the Supreme Court has considered to date).
51. Those states are: Arkansas, California, Delaware, Florida, Idaho,
Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and
Washington. National Conference of State Legislatures, Cyberbullying,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/educ/cyberbullying.htm (last visited Oct. 17,
2009).
52. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60
FLA. L. REV. 1027, 1096-97 (2008) (emphasis added).
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
In the absence of a Supreme Court ruling
pertaining to a school district's anti-harassment
policy or to the application of unwritten
restrictions in this regard, school authorities are
left to navigate a maze of conflicting lower
court rulings in their efforts to provide legal
guidance to school boards in enacting policies
and to educators in implementing the
provisions.53
An anti-harassment policy targeting Internet-based speech
that does not occur on school grounds further muddles this area,
making it an ideal issue for Supreme Court consideration. Indeed,
the High Court could kill two legal birds with one grant of certiorari
if it were to take a case involving a school cyberbullying policy that
was used to punish a student for creating, while off campus and on
his or her own time, a blog entry, Internet posting, or fake MySpace
profile that allegedly harassed a classmate.
IV.JUVENILE DETENTION & JAIL As PUNISHMENT FOR FREE
EXPRESSION? STRANGE BUT SADLY TRUE
In February 2009, The New York Times reported that
Hillary Transue, a high school student in Wilkes-Barre,
Pennsylvania, was sentenced "to three months at a juvenile
detention center on a charge of harassment., 54 What was her
crime? Creating "a spoof MySpace page mocking the assistant
principal at her high school"55 that began with a first page that
"stated clearly at the bottom that it was just a joke."56
The story only came to light because it turned out that the
sentencing judge in Transue's case, along with another judge, was
"taking more than $2.6 million in kickbacks to send teenagers to
53. Martha McCarthy, Anti-Harassment Provisions Revisited: No Bright-
Line Rule, 2008 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 225, 243 (2008).
54. Ian Urbina & Sean D. Hamill, Judges Plead Guilty in Scheme to Jail
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two privately run youth detention centers run by PA Child Care
and a sister company, Western PA Child Care."57 Given that such
judicial graft likely makes Transue's situation unique, it seems
highly improbable that other students will end up going to a
detention facility for exercising their free expression rights online.
In a somewhat poetic twist for a person punished for her writing,
Transue, now a high school senior, "plans to become an English
teacher.,
58
Another new form of high-tech student expression that
often winds up on the Internet and that now has teens headed for
both in-school punishment and the criminal justice system is
"sexting." 59 The term combines "sex" and "texting," and has been
defined as "the sending of sexually explicit messages or photos
electronically" 6  and the process of "sending, receiving or
forwarding sexually explicit pictures through text messages or e-
mails., 61 To the extent that the photos are taken off campus by
minors on their own time and via their own cell phones, should
schools have any ability to punish the minors for provocative
57. Id.
58. Michael Rubinkam & Mary Claire Dale, Pa. Judges Accused of
Jailing Kids for Cash, PRESS-REGISTR (Mobile, Ala.), Feb. 12, 2009, at A6,
available at 2009 WLNR 3021035.
59. See Beth DeFalco, Teen Charged with Child Porn After She Posts
Nude Shots of Herself on [MySpace], VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Mar. 27, 2009, at 5,
available at 2009 WLNR 5771764 (describing a fourteen-year-old girl from
Passaic County, New Jersey, who faced child pornography charges "after
posting nearly 30 explicit nude pictures of herself on MySpace.com-charges
that could force her to register as a sex offender if convicted."); Police Call 3
Teen Girls' 'Sexted' Photos 'Dumb Stuff,' PATRIOT NEWS (Harrisburg, Pa.),
Jan. 30, 2009, at Al (reporting that three high-school girls from Westmoreland
County, Pennsylvania "were charged with manufacturing and disseminating or
possessing child pornography after they allegedly sent nude or seminude cell
phone pictures of themselves to three male classmates. The boys, ages 16 and
17, were charged with possession of child pornography for having the images
on their phones.").
60. Annette Baird, Internet Seminar Focused on Safety of Youths Course
Taught Parents Importance of Being Vigilant, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 6, 2009,
at Z13:3.
61. Timothy Wilson, Teens Online And on Cells But Not on Their Guard,
WASH. POST, July 9, 2009, at District Extra 3.
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images? That question was posed in a June 1, 2009, editorial in the
Los Angeles Times that queried:
Forwarding nude pictures isn't just cruel. It can
be illegal if the pictures are of children under
age 18, as schools and parents across the
country have learned when prosecutors became
involved. But doing something about sexting
begins with disagreement about what precisely
to consider it. Is it child pornography? An
exercise of free speech? A school disciplinary
matter? The parents' responsibility? 62
To put it bluntly, topless photos of sixteen-year-old girls
may not constitute criminal child pornography,63 but they
62. Editorial, Keeping an Eye on Sexting, L.A. TIMES, June 1, 2009, at
A18 (emphasis added).
63. Under federal statutory law, child pornography is defined as:
any visual depiction, including any photograph, film,
video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image
or picture, whether made or produced by electronic,
mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct,
where
(A) the production of such visual depiction involves
the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
(B) such visual depiction is a digital image, computer
image, or computer-generated image that is, or is
indistinguishable from, that of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct; or
(C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or
modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging
in sexually explicit conduct.
18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2006).
The term "sexually explicit conduct" used within the above-referenced
federal statutory definition of child pornography is defined as:
(i) graphic sexual intercourse, including genital-genital,
oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between
persons of the same or opposite sex, or lascivious
simulated sexual intercourse where the genitals, breast, or
pubic area of any person is exhibited;
(ii) graphic or lascivious simulated:
(I) bestiality;
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nonetheless make a school look bad by suggesting, however
implicitly, that its students are sexually promiscuous. There will
likely be increased efforts to punish students for such off-campus-
created sexual speech based solely on the justification that the
images damage the reputation of the school. 64 It also seems likely,
however, that schools will not admit that reason, but instead will
assert that discussion of the sexted images on campus causes a
substantial and material disruption of the academic atmosphere
and, thus, the student who transmits or posts them can be punished
in school under the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.65 It
will be all about image-the kind the school wants to project to
parents and the public, not the kind that one student sends to
66another as a high-tech form of flirting.
(II) masturbation; or
(III) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or
(iii) graphic or simulated lascivious exhibition of the
genitals or pubic area of any person.
Id. § 2556(2)(B).
64. In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), the
Supreme Court upheld the censorship of two articles that allegedly harmed
the school's reputation-one about girls at the school who were pregnant and
the other about the effects of divorce on students at the school. Hazelwood,
however, only applies to school-sponsored student speech and speech that is
part of the curriculum, so it should not be a viable tool for censorship of
"sexted" student images when the images are taken, transmitted, and
downloaded off campus on the students' own phones. "Sexted" images, in
brief, are not school sponsored, rendering Hazelwood irrelevant.
65. 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (protecting the right of public school
students in Iowa to wear black armbands to school as a form of protest against
and a call for a truce in the war in Vietnam and reasoning that schools may
censor such student displays of political expression only when there is actual
evidence that the speech in question "materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others").
66. See Ellen Goodman, It's Not About Sex: Sexting Is Really About
Trust, and the Violation Thereof, Pmr. POST-GAZETrE, Apr. 24, 2009,
http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/09114/965103-109.stm (quoting Danah Boyd
of Harvard University's Berkman Center for Internet and Society for the
proposition that "[i]f you look at the reasons why they share naked content,
one is a form of flirting. Another is a way of brokering trust, a guy saying,
'You don't trust me? You won't send me a naked picture?').
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V. ANOTHER FAKE PROFILE, ANOTHER PEEVED PRINCIPAL
The speech at issue in the recent federal district court
opinions of Layshock v. Hermitage School District67 and J.S. v. Blue
Mountain School District68 centered on fake MySpace profiles
created by students, while off campus, about their respective
principals. 6' A new twist on that situation arose in 2009 when Cyd
Duffin, the principal at Colony High School in Alaska, filed a
lawsuit for libel and invasion of privacy over a fake MySpace
profile that depicts her "as a drug-using racist with a sexually
transmitted disease who insults disabled students and likes books
about pornography, anarchy and the Ku Klux Klan."'  In
comments regarding the profile that were published in the Colony
High School student newspaper, The Knightly News, Duffin stated:
The most hurtful aspect of this hasn't been so
much the way the person who created the site
offended me. It is the way they characterized
Colony High School-OUR school. By saying
such racist and bigoted comments about our
minority and disabled students, they inflicted
hurt on our entire student body and insulted
the integrity of everyone here. We respect and
appreciate diversity. We honor ALL of our
students at CHS, regardless of ability, skin
color, culture, religion, or gender. It was
71
wrong.
What makes this case different is that, unlike the principals
in Layshock and J.S., the Colony High School principal does not
67. 496 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
68. No. 3:07CV585, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72685 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11,
2008).
69. See generally Calvert, supra note 1 (discussing both Layshock and
J. S.).
70. Zaz Hollander, Abusive MySpace Page Draws Principal's Lawsuit,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Apr. 4, 2009, http:lwww.adn.comlnewslalaskal
matsu/story1748805.html.
71. Shelby McCormick, Cyber Bullying: Attacks Hit Colony, KNIGHTLY
NEWS (Alaska), Dec. 2008, at 1, 4 (on file with author).
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know who created the phony profile." It might have been a
student; on the other hand, it could have been someone else.
Principal Duffin thus sued MySpace, Inc. and unnamed "Doe"73
defendants.74 MySpace, Inc. likely will escape liability for the fake
profile under the Good Samaritan provision of the
Communications Decency Act, 5  which protects interactive
computer services76 from liability for content posted by third
parties.77 Indeed, that same provision shielded MySpace, Inc. from
civil liability in 2008 for a sexual assault committed by one MySpace
user against another.78
Assuming this is the case, the major battle will be whether
Principal Duffin will be able to force MySpace, Inc., via subpoena,
to reveal the identity of the individual who created the fake profile.
Duffin's lawsuit was filed in Los Angeles County Superior Court,79
which means that Duffin, under a recent California appellate court
72. Hollander, supra note 70.
73. See generally Carol M. Rice, Meet John Doe: It is Time For Federal
Civil Procedure to Recognize John Doe Parties, 57 U. PITr. L. REV. 883, 885
(1996) (providing an overview and background on "Doe pleading," in which
"John Doe preserves the plaintiff's claim by standing in for an unknown
defendant while the plaintiff tries to determine the defendant's actual name").
74. Hollander, supra note 70.
75. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006).
76. The law defines an interactive computer service as "any information
service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer
access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service
or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or
services offered by libraries or educational institutions." Id. § 230(f)(2).
77. The law provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider." Id. §
230(c)(1). Courts have interpreted this provision broadly to provide immunity
for interactive computer services for content posted by third parties. See
Chicago Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.,
519 F.3d 666, 669-72 (7th Cir. 2008) (describing how courts have "broadly"
interpreted this provision).
78. Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008).
79. Hollander, supra note 70.
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decision,' ° would need to make an initial attempt to notify the Doe
defendant of the lawsuit and "make a prima facie showing of the
elements of libel in order to overcome a defendant's motion to
quash a subpoena seeking his or her identity."81
If she succeeds at this task and if it turns out that the person
who created the fake profile was indeed a student, then the
question will be whether Duffin decides to seek in-school
punishment against him or her. Such in-school punishment, of
course, would come in addition to her civil lawsuit, giving her two
avenues of redress. This result would illustrate the larger problem
with punishing students in school for speech that they create off
campus. In particular, Principal Duffin already has a civil law
remedy against the student via her libel suit, assuming she discovers
who created the website. Why should she have two bites at the
punishment apple, one in court and one in school?82
Ultimately, however, we will never know the answers to
these questions as they pertain to this particular dispute. The
Student Press Law Center reported in July 2009 that Duffin
dropped her lawsuit against MySpace, Inc. after "the two students
responsible for the page confessed to Duffin" and explained to her
that "they were just having fun, got carried away and realized too
late that they had crossed the line."
83
To her credit, Duffin got it correct when she told the
Student Press Law Center after the dismissal that "[i]n the world of
the Internet, kids are just exploring a new territory, and the laws
80. See Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231 (Ct. App. 2008)
(considering when a party may compel the disclosure of a person who posts
anonymously on the Internet).
81. Id. at 245.
82. See generally Clay Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus
Punishment. Censorship of the Emerging Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. SCI.
& TECH. L. 243, 251 (2001) (describing how three "separate justice systems-
criminal/juvenile, civil, and school-increasingly are wrapped up in cases"
involving off-campus, Internet-based posting by students).
83. Brian Stewart, Principal Drops Suit Against MySpace After Students
Come Forward for Making Fake Profile, STUDENT PRESS LAW CM., July 14,
2009, http://www.splc.org/newsflash.asp?id=1935.
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haven't caught up with it."'84 Indeed, children will continue to
explore and push the boundaries of free speech in cyberspace until
the laws catch up with both teens and technology.
VI. APPELLATE COURT RULINGS STILL WAITING IN THE
WINGS
As of mid-November 2009, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit had yet to issue its much-anticipated rulings in the
online-student-speech cases of Layshock85 and J.S. 81 Oral argument
took place in Layshock in December 2008." Witold Walczak, an
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) attorney who argued the
case on behalf of student Justin Layshock, asserted during oral
argument that "the issue is whether school officials have any
authority once you leave the schoolhouse gate."8 8 Judge Theodore
E. McKee seemed to agree with this framing of the issue, as he
queried during the hearing, "[h]ow far can a school extend its
reach?"89  Arguing the case for the school district, Anthony
Sanchez of Andrews & Price9° in Pittsburgh stated that "[w]here
the schoolhouse is has changed," and that the Internet has "blurred
the lines"'" between off-campus speech and on-campus speech.
92
84. Id. See also S.J. Komarnitsky, Valley Principal Ends MySpace Suit,
ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, July 17, 2009, http://www.adn.com/news/alaska/
matsu/story/867343.html ("Although Duffin's case is resolved, the thorny
question of how to deal with such fake Web pages and what, if any, recourse
there should be for the targets of such pranks remains.").
85. 496 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
86. No. 3:07CV585, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72685 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 11,
2008). See Calvert, supra note 1 (describing Layshock and J.S.).
87. Jennifer Lin, Appeals Court Hears MySpace Case, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Dec. 11, 2008, at B5.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Andrews & Price, Firm Overview, http://www.andrewsand
price.com/sub/firm-overview.jsp (last visited Sept. 25, 2009) (describing the
firm's practice as based "on partnering with school districts, municipalities,
and other public sector entities").
91. Lin, supra note 87, at B5.
92. Id. See also Shannon P. Duffy, 3rd Circuit Mulls School Discipline
for Hoax Web Pages, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 11, 2008,
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Readers seeking further information on the Layshock case,
including copies of briefs and pleadings, can find them on the
ACLU of Pennsylvania's website.93
Oral argument in J.S. took place in June 2009 before a
different three-judge panel of the Third Circuit;94 pleadings and
motions filed in that case are available on the website of the Citizen
Media Law Project.95
Ultimately, no matter how the Third Circuit rules in these
two cases, the Supreme Court must finally agree to hear a case
involving the First Amendment speech rights of students who, while
off campus, create and post messages on the Internet about their
principals, teachers, or classmates. Until that time, neither students
nor administrators will know just how far school authorities'
jurisdiction stretches beyond the geographic boundaries of public
school campuses and the temporal confines of the school day. The
doctrine of qualified immunity, described in Part I, will continue to
fill this judicial vacuum and allow school officials to escape
monetary liability for their censorial tendencies until the Court
finally rules on the matter.
Finally, one might ask what the Supreme Court's newest
member might do if given the opportunity to consider an off-
campus-created student speech case. In fact, Justice Sonia
Sotomayor, who was sworn in to the Supreme Court in August
2009, was part of the unanimous three-judge panel of the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit that ruled against student Avery
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202426654073 (describing oral
argument in Layshock).
93. See ACLU of Pa., Layshock v. Hermitage School District,
http://www.aclupa.org/legallegaldocket/studentsuspendedforinterne.htm (last
visited Sept. 25, 2009).
94. See Lawsuits Test Free Speech in Internet Era, ESCHOOL NEWS, June
4, 2009, http://www.eschoolnews.com/news/top-news/news-by-subject/
litigation/?i=59055 (describing portions of the oral argument in the case, and
noting that Mary Catherine Roper of the ACLU argued the case on behalf of
the student while Jon Riba argued on behalf of the school district).
95. See Citizen Media Law Project, Blue Mountain School District v. J.S.,
http://www.citmedialaw.org/threats/blue-mountain-school-district-v-js (last
visited Aug. 15, 2009).
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Doninger in Doninger9' when that dispute reached the appellate
level in 2008.9' Although Sotomayor did not write the pro-school
opinion in Doninger, she joined it.98 Thus, the Second Circuit's
ruling against Avery Doninger's off-campus speech rights may not
bode well for First Amendment advocates should such an off-
campus speech case ever reach the Supreme Court.
It may, in fact, be the Doninger case that the Supreme
Court eventually does hear, as it was working its way back up
through the appellate court system in late 2009, with the qualified
immunity question addressed in Part I of this article playing a key
role.99 In particular, in May 2009, U.S. District Judge Mark Kravitz
certified two questions for review by the Second Circuit:
1. Did Defendants' discipline of Plaintiff in
response to her blog entry violate the First
Amendment[?];
2. Do Defendants have qualified immunity on
Plaintiff's First Amendment claim because the
right at issue was not clearly established at the
time of the events and/or a reasonable official
would not have understood that the discipline
imposed violated that right[?]100
In certifying these questions, Judge Kravitz observed that
"[t]here seems little doubt that the First Amendment issues raised
by the blog entry claim are ones for which there is a substantial
difference of opinion"' 0'1 and that "there is a substantial ground for
difference of opinions on the First Amendment and qualified
immunity issues presented by the blog entry claim."' 0 2 The Second
Circuit had not ruled on the case when this article went to print.
96. 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008). See discussion supra Part I.
97. Id.
98. Id. The opinion was written by Circuit Judge Livingston.
99. See discussion supra Part I.
100. Doninger v. Niehoff, No. 3:07CV1129(MRK), 2009 WL 1364890, at
*3 (D. Conn. May 14, 2009).
101. Id. at *2.
102. Id.
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The bottom line is that one year after I wrote an article for
this journal about the profound muddle that is the body of
jurisprudence surrounding the free speech rights of public school
students in cyberspace, precious little has been done on the judicial
front to clarify it. The pending decisions in Layshock and J.S. may
bring some clarity, but then only within the Third Circuit. Whether
it be in Layshock, J.S., or Donniger, it is time for the Supreme
Court to enter into the fray to resolve the confusion and to bring
uniformity so that both students and principals know the legal
boundaries and so that the doctrine of qualified immunity can no
longer be abused in the name of censorship.
